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NOTES AND COMMENTS
other than the immediate concerns of the petitioner,' 3 it is urged that
if all those interests are considered, residence requirements for di-
vorce of limited duration will pass constitutional examination.
PETER R. KOLYER
PRIORITY OF EMPLOYMENT TAXES ON PRE-
BANKRUPTCY WAGES UNDER SECTION 64a OF
THE BANKRUPTCY ACT
While the congressional policy regarding the distribution of a
bankrupt's assets has generally been one of equality of treatment
among unsecured creditors,' the Bankruptcy Act has provided for
certain exceptions. 2 One of the most significant of these exceptions
is found in § 64a 3 which outlines a comprehensive scheme of priori-
'°See note 121 supra.
'E.g., H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1966); United States v. Em-
bassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 31 (1959); Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color
Corp., 313 U.S. 215, 219 (1941); Wurzel, Taxation During Bankruptcy Liquidation, 55
HARv. L. REv. 1141 (1942). See also 3 W. COLLIER, BANKRuPTcY 60.01, at 743 (14th
ed. 1972) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
'One exception to the general principle of equality of distribution in bankruptcy
is found in § 57d of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 93d (1970). This section requires
that a claim must not only be provable under § 63 and proved and filed pursuant to
§ 57, but must also be allowed by the court in order to be entitled to a pro rata share
upon distribution. In effect this incorporates equity considerations which may result
in disallowance or subordination of certain claims.
3Bankruptcy Act § 64a, 11 U.S.C. § 104a (1970), reads in part as follows:
The debts to have priority, in advance of the payment of divi-
dends to creditors, and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, and
the order of payment, shall be (1) the costs and expenses of adminis-
tration, including the [actual and necessary costs and expenses] of
preserving the estate subsequent to filing the petition . . . (2) wages
and commissions, not to exceed $600 to each claimant, which have
been earned within three months before the date of the commence-
ment of the proceeding. . . (4) taxes which became legally due and
owing by the bankrupt to the United States or to any State or any
subdivision thereof which are not released by a discharge in bank-
ruptcy. . . (5) debts other than for taxes owing to any person, includ-
ing the United States . . ..
While the scheme of priorities of § 64a represents an exception to the principle of
equality of distribution among the bankrupt's unsecured creditors, the scheme is con-
sistent with the broader goal of achieving an equitable distribution of the bankrupt's
estate. For example, giving first priority to costs and expenses of administration en-
courages efficient administration and protects both the bankrupt and the various
unsecured creditors.
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ties to be followed by the trustee in distributing the bankrupt's es-
tate. This sytem of priorities, however, has not been applied without
some difficulty and has required many changes to the basic priority
provisions.' One of the frequently encountered problems which re-
mains unresolved is the question of what priority, if any, is to be given
withholding taxes5 and employer excise taxes' due upon payment of
pre-bankruptcy wage claims.
7
Specifically, § 64a of the Bankruptcy Act lists five categories of
claims to be paid by the trustee in bankruptcy before any payment
'For a discussion of the legislative history of § 64a of the Bankruptcy Act, see 3A
COLLIER 64.01, at 2046-63.
IINw. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3102 and 3402 require the employer to withhold
certain amounts from the employee's wages. Section 3102 provides that "[tihe tax
imposed by section 3101 [Hospital insurance, old age, survivors and disability insur-
ance] shall be collected by the employer of the taxpayer, by deducting the amount of
the tax from the wages as and when paid." Similarly, § 3402, entitled INCOME TAX
COLLECTED AT SOURCE, reads in part: "[elvery employer making payment of wages
shall deduct and withhold upon such wages (except as otherwise provided in this
section) a tax determined in accordance with the following tables."
IINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3111 specifies that "[iln addition to other taxes, there
is hereby imposed on every employer an excise tax, with respect to having individuals
in his employ, equal to the following percentages of the wages . . . paid by him with
respect to employment .... " This excise tax is more popularly known as the em-
ployer's contribution to the Social Security tax. Similarly, INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 3301 imposes an unemployment excise tax on the employer equal to 3.2% of total
wages paid.
'Pre-bankruptcy wage claims are claims made against the bankrupt's estate by
employees of the bankrupt for wages earned prior to the initiation of any bankruptcy
proceedings. Since § 64a(2) of the Bankruptcy Act generally provides a second priority
status for these wage claims, the question of priority is confined to the employment
taxes related to the wage claims.
An issue preliminary to the question of priority is whether the trustee in bank-
ruptcy is required to withhold taxes and to file the required forms pertaining to such
withholdings as if he were the employer paying the wages. The overwhelming consen-
sus of authority is that since the trustee "stands in the shoes of the bankrupt," and
since the dividends paid as wage claims are wages, the trustee is required to make the
withholdings and to file the records in question. E.g., In re Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d
184 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964);
Lines v. California Dep't of Employment, 242 F.2d 201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S.
857 (1957); United States v. Curtis, 178 F.2d 268 (6th Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S.
965 (1950); United States v. Fogarty, 164 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1947). See also In re John
Horne Co., 220 F.2d 33 (7th Cir. 1955). The employment forms required to be filed by
the person paying the wages are described at note 23 infra.
The only disagreement has come from the referees themselves who argue that such
requirements are an undue burden on the assets of the estate. See Hiller, The Folly of
the Fogarty Case, 32 REF. J. 54 (1958); Oglebay, Some Developments in Bankruptcy
Law, 23 REF. J. 12, 15 (1948); Oglebay, Some Developments in Bankruptcy Law, 22
REF. J. 82, 84 (1948).
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of dividends to general creditors." Three of these five categories have
been considered by federal circuit courts as applicable to a determi-
nation of the priority of withholding and employer excise taxes paya-
ble on pre-bankruptcy wage claims. The applicable categories are
first priority "costs and expenses of administration" of the bank-
rupt's estate,' second priority wage claims, 0 and fourth priority
"taxes which became legally due and owing by the bankrupt.""
The question of priority of withholding and employer excise taxes
due upon payment of pre-bankruptcy wage claims was first confront-
ed in 1947 by the Eighth Circuit in United States v. Fogarty.2 The
court held that since such taxes were post-bankruptcy taxes in the
sense that they were paid after bankruptcy proceedings had begun,
they were by definition first priority expenses of administration.
2 3
Thus, the taxes were entitled to payment not only before all general
claims but also before other claims of lesser priority. 4
The second position adopted by the circuit courts as to the prior-
ity question of such taxes was set forth some seventeen years later by
the Third Circuit in In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc. The
Third Circuit refused to follow the Eighth Circuit and determined
that the various employment taxes on pre-bankruptcy wages were
only entitled to a fourth priority status as taxes which became "le-
gally due and owing by the bankrupt."'"
The conflict among the circuits has been further complicated by
the most recent development in this area of the law. In In re Freedom-
land, Inc.,"7 the Second Circuit rejected the positions of the Eighth
and Third Circuits and determined that withholding taxes based on
'Bankruptcy Act § 64a, 11 U.S.C. § 104a (1970).
'Bankruptcy Act § 64a(1), 11 U.S.C. § 104a(1) (1970).
"Bankruptcy Act § 64a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 104a(2) (1970).
"Bankruptcy Act § 64a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104a(4) (1970).
12164 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1947).
"Id. at 33. The Fogarty rationale was subsequently adopted by the Ninth Circuit
in Lines v. California Dep't of Employment, 242 F.2d 201 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355
U.S. 857 (1957).
"It is generally the rule that all claims share pro rata in the estate when the assets
of the bankrupt are not sufficient to satisfy all claims of the same class. One exception
to this general rule is outlined in § 64a(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104a(1)
(1970), which provides that costs and expenses of administration of a superseding
bankruptcy proceeding shall have priority over the costs and expenses of an earlier
bankruptcy proceeding.
11336 F.2d 96 (3d Cir. 1964). The priority enunciated in Connecticut Motor Lines
was followed in In re Erie Forge Steel Corp., No. 69-83 (W.D. Pa., filed Dec. 19, 1972).
16336 F.2d at 106.
11480 F.2d 184 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3415 (U.S. Jan. 22, 1974)
(No. 375).
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pre-bankruptcy wages should be aggregated with wage claims and
accorded a second priority status. 8
In Freedomland, the corporation had filed an arrangement peti-
tion 9 pursuant to Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act on September
15, 1964, and was adjudicated a bankrupt on August 30 of the follow-
ing year. During the statutory period for filing claims 20 over four
hundred claims of $600 or less,2' totalling approximately $80,000,
were filed by former employees of the bankrupt corporation for wages
earned prior to the filing of the Chapter XI petition. No claims,
however, were filed by the federal government or the City of New
York for income and other employment taxes during the statutory
period for filing claims.2 1 On November 7, 1969, the trustee moved the
referee for an order declaring that the trustee was not required to file
any employment tax statementsn relating to the payment of wage
claims. The trustee also requested the referee to authorize the pay-
ment of such claims without allowance for any employment taxes.
After the referee granted the order, an appeal from the order was
brought by the federal and city governments in the district court.
The district court held that the trustee was required to file the
appropriate employment tax forms and that federal withholding
taxes must be paid, but only as fourth priority taxes legally due and
owing by the bankrupt, and not as first priority administrative expen-
ses as the federal government had contended. 21 In addition, the court
determined that the city was not entitled to any withholding taxes
since the city income tax law had not been enacted until after the
"Id. at 190.
"Bankruptcy Act §§ 301-99, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1970). Arrangement is broadly
defined in § 306(1) of the Bankruptcy Act to mean "any plan of a debtor for the
settlement, satisfaction, or extension of the time of payment of his unsecured debts,
upon any terms."
2'Bankruptcy Act § 57, 11 U.S.C. § 93 (1970), specifies the procedure for filing
claims against the bankrupt's estate. Unless otherwise provided, claims must be filed
within six months after the date of the first meeting of the creditors.
2'Bankruptcy Act § 64a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 104a(2) (1970), specifies that wage claims
of each individual claimant may not exceed $600.
nSee notes 25, 26 and 47 infra.
2INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6011 and § 6051 and the regulations thereunder re-
quire the employer to maintain and file certain employment-related forms and to
provide employees with wage and tax information. Examples of such forms include the
annual statement of social security and income tax withheld on wages, Form W-2, and
the employer's quarterly tax returns, Form 940 for unemployment tax, and Form 941
for income tax and social security tax withheld. See generally Treas. Reg. § 31.6011(a)-
1 et seq.
21341 F. Supp. 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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wages had been earned. 25 On appeal, the Second Circuit held that
while the trustee was required to file the tax forms, the federal and
city withholding taxes were neither entitled to fourth priority as the
lower court had decided nor first priority as the governments had
contended. The court instead determined the withholding taxes were
entitled to second priority status as part of the wage claims.26
In analyzing these various positions it should be noted that the
Fogarty determination, that withholding and employer excise taxes
on pre-bankruptcy wages are payable as costs and expenses of admin-
istration, has been severely criticized by both the courts" and the
commentators.28 As the Third Circuit pointed out in deciding
Connecticut Motor Lines, "[tihe ultimate result in Fogarty rests on
a number of cases which lend little support to the holding and, if
anything, detract from the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit." 9 Specifi-
r-The district court in Freedomland reasoned that since the city income tax had
not been enacted until after the filing of the Chapter XI petition, the tax was not
"computable" at the initiation of the bankruptcy proceeding. Since the tax was not
computable, it could not be considered to have become legally due and owing at the
time of the initiation of the bankruptcy proceedings and failed to qualify for fourth
priority treatment. 341 F. Supp. at 658. For a discussion of the requirement of comput-
ability, see note 39 infra and accompanying text.
The Second Circuit avoided this statutory objection by including the city with-
holding taxes as part of wages and thus entitled to a second priority. 480 F.2d at 191.
Because no vested rights were impaired, the Second Circuit found no constitutional
barrier to this determination even though the wages on which the taxes were based
were earned prior to the enactment of the city income tax law. For a discussion of the
general effect of a retroactive tax on the distribution of a bankrupt's estate, see 3A
COLuER 64.405[1], at 2177 n.1. For a discussion of the constitutionality of a retroac-
tive tax, see Welch v. Henry, 305 U.S. 134, 146-51 (1938); Milliken v. United States,
283 U.S. 15, 20-24 (1931); Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140, 152-53
(1911).
The district court in Freedomland also held that the federal government's claim
was not barred because of failure to submit a proof of claim within the six month
statutory period. 341 F. Supp. 657-58. For a contrary result see In re Connecticut Motor
Lines, 336 F.2d 96, 107 (3d Cir. 1964). See note 47 infra.
2The Second Circuit also affirmed the district court's determination that the
governments' claim was not barred because of failure to submit a timely claim under
§ 57 of the Act. 480 F.2d at 191.
2E.g., In re Freedomland, Inc., 480 F.2d 184, 187 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Connecticut
Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96, 99 (3d Cir. 1964); In re John Home Co., 220 F.2d 33
(7th Cir. 1955) (dictum).
133A COLLIER § 64.202, at 2119; Comment, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1103 (1965); Com-
ment, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 360 (1965). See also Note, Bankruptcy Priority of Govern-
ment's Claim to Withholding Taxes Arising from a Wage Distribution: In re Connecti-
cut Motor Lines, Inc., 19 RUTGERS L. REv. 546 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Rutgers
Bankruptcy Note].
"336 F.2d at 99.
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cally, the facts of the cases upon which Fogarty relied differed signifi-
cantly from the facts of Fogarty.3 0 In the cases relied on, all the
withholding taxes were based on wages earned subsequent to some
type of bankruptcy proceeding, while in Fogarty the labor involved
was performed prior to the initiation of any bankruptcy proceeding.
The significance of this slight differentiation of facts is that in the
cases in which the wages were earned subsequent to the bankruptcy
proceeding, the wage expenses upon which the taxes were based were
incurred in continuing the business of the debtor for the benefit of the
creditors. Thus, taxes were related to the development, preservation,
or distribution of the estate.3 ' If, as has been suggested,3 the true
focus of congressional intent is to limit first priority expenses and
costs of administration to those charges which are related to the
development, preservation, or distribution of the bankrupt's estate,
it seems proper to conclude that the employment taxes in the cases
relied on by Fogarty were entitled to first priority status only because
the wages were incurred in the furtherance of one of these functions.
The mere fact that taxes are paid after bankruptcy proceedings have
begun would not seem to provide adequate grounds for promoting
them to a priority reserved for payments essential to the protection
of creditors.3
Applying the proper interpretation of the cases relied upon by the
court in Fogarty to the facts of that case, it would appear that em-
ployment taxes on wages earned before the bankruptcy proceedings
were not entitled to first priority status as the Eighth Circuit had
concluded. The taxes were based on wages for labor which had no
relation to the development, preservation, or distribution of the as-
sets in bankruptcy. 4 More importantly, giving withholding and ex-
"Id. n.10.
"Id. at 99.
"Adair v. Bank of American Ass'n, 303 U.S. 350, 360-61 (1938); In re Connecticut
Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96, 101-02 (3d Cir. 1964).
"The conclusion that the employment taxes in the case cited in Fogarty were not
first priority claims is reinforced by the fact that other courts have decided that some
taxes and expenses paid after the date of bankruptcy were not first priority claims.
E.g., Denton & Anderson Co. v. Induction Heating Corp., 178 F.2d 841 (2d Cir. 1949)
(commissions accruing after bankruptcy on goods ordered but not delivered prior
thereto held not entitled to first priority status); In re Mt. Washington S.S. Co., 43 F.
Supp. 176 (D.N.H. 1942) (state tax assessed against a vessel four days after bankruptcy
petition was filed was not payable as a current expense of administration).
31Since the wage claims upon which the taxes were based were for labor performed
prior to the initiation of any bankruptcy proceeding, the wage claims cannot be consid-
ered as related to the development, preservation, or distribution of the assets in bank-
ruptcy. Therefore, the withholding taxes were not taxes on the distribution of the assets
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cise taxes first priority would be contrary to the general congressional
policy of subordinating taxes to wages, 35 since such a practice would
reduce the amounts otherwise available for second priority wage
claims.3
The alternative solution proposed by the Third Circuit in
Connecticut Motor Lines also presents problems. By placing employ-
ment taxes in the fourth priority category under § 64a(4) of "taxes
which became legally due and owning," the policy objections pre-
sented by the Fogarty approach were eliminated. However, § 64a(4)
seems to dictate a different conclusion as to employment taxes by the
plain meaning of its language.
Several objections based upon statutory construction of § 64a(4)
can be made to a fourth priority status. The first arises from the
requirement of that section that the taxes be legally due and owing
by the bankrupt. It can be contended, as the Second Circuit did in
Freedomland,3 that withholding and excise taxes due on pre-
bankruptcy wage claims were never legally due and owing by the
bankrupt, but rather were owing only by the trustee in bankruptcy.
This contention, however, is severely weakened by the established
view among the courts that the trustee "stands in the shoes of the
bankrupt" and succeeds to the obligations of the bankrupt.3
A second and more formidable statutory objection stems from the
well-recognized rule that a tax does not become legally due and owing
until it is certain in amount. 9 When, as in Connecticut Motor Lines,
the amount of the tax depends upon the wages paid, it would seem
the tax could not become legally due and owing at the time of the
commencement of bankruptcy proceedings since it is unclear what
amount of wage claims will actually be submitted and paid.
in bankruptcy, but were taxes on the employment relationship existing prior to bank-
ruptcy. See Comment, 40 N.Y.U.L. REV. 360, 361-62 (1965).
"See text accompanying note 40 infra.
"In re Connecticut Motor Lines, Inc., 336 F.2d 96, 102 (3d Cir. 1964); 3A CoLLMR
1 64,20112.21, at 2111.
"'the Second Circuit in Freedomland rejected the fourth priority status on the
basis that the employment taxes were never legally due and owing by the bankrupt.
480 F.2d at 190. The court reasoned that since the taxes were not due and owing until
the wages were paid and since the bankrupt never paid any of the wages in question,
the bankrupt never owed such taxes. Id.
"See note 7 supra.
31It is generally recognized that a tax becomes legally due and owing when all the
facts necessary for its calculation are known. E.g., In re Ingersoll Co., 148 F.2d 282
(10th Cir. 1945); In re Int'l Match Corp., 79 F.2d 203 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, Delaware
v. Irving Trust Co., 296 U.S. 652 (1935). See also 3A COLLIER 64.405[l], at 2178.
This requirement is referred to as the "rule of computability." See note 25 supra.
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Additionally, it has been argued that because Congress clearly
intended that federal tax claims be given priority over general claims,
employment taxes should be given a priority which effectuates that
intent despite the fact that the language of § 64a(4) seems to conflict
with congressional intention. 0 However, there is no clear congres-
sional intent that all federal taxes should be given a fourth priority."
Thus, it would appear that, read literally, § 64a(4) must be recog-
nized as a barrier to assigning fourth priority status to withholding
and excise taxes.
In the most recent development on this point of law, the Second
Circuit in In re Freedomland, Inc. determined that withholding
taxes42 based on pre-bankruptcy wage claims which were not related
to the development, preservation, or distribution of the bankrupt's
estate during bankruptcy should be accorded second priority status.
The court held that such withholding taxes were "derived from the
payments that will be made to the wage claimants," and should be
conceptually treated as if they were wages.13 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Second Circuit relied exclusively on In re Quakertown Shop-
ping Center, Inc.," which held that the Internal Revenue Service
could levy upon the claim of a taxpayer-creditor of the bankrupt
without approval of the bankruptcy court since the levy was merely
an involuntary assignment by the creditor to the IRS. The court in
Freedomland thus seemed to suggest that the withholding taxes
should be treated as included in the wages paid to the claimants and
contemporaneously assigned to the IRS at the time of payment. How-
ever appealing such an analysis may be, it seems inaccurate in light
of the conceptual treatment which has been accorded withholding
taxes in the Internal Revenue Code, a treatment relied upon by the
Second Circuit in Freedomland.
As the Freedomland court noted, the withholding tax claims
should be segregated by the employer, or the trustee in a bankruptcy
proceeding, and held as trust funds consistent with § 7501(a) of the
"Comment, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 360, 364 (1965). The writer apparently bases this
proposition on the legislative history of § 64.
"The language of the Bankruptcy Act expressly provides that not all taxes should
have fourth prioriy. Bankruptcy Act § 64a(4), 11 U.S.C. § 104a(4) (1970), states "that
no priority over general unsecured claims shall pertain to taxes not included in the
foregoing priority."
"The court in Freedomland did not address itself to the question of what priority,
if any, should be given excise taxes imposed on the employer by INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§§ 3111 and 3301. 480 F.2d at 186. See text accompanying note 66 infra.
"1480 F.2d at 190.
"366 F.2d 95 (3d Cir. 1966).
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Internal Revenue Code.45 This section provides for the creation of a
trust fund in favor of the United States "whenever any person is
required to collect or withhold any internal revenue tax from any
other person . . . ." However, the treatment of withholding taxes as
a trust means that conceptually the wage claimants never acquired
any interest in the fund. The withholding tax fund remained with the
trustee in bankruptcy for the special use of the United States. The
wage claimants could not possibly have assigned such a fund to the
United States as their creditor, either voluntarily or involuntarily,
since the claimants had no rights in the trust fund."6 Thus, reference
to the creation of a trust under § 7501(a) appears to negate the invol-
untary assignment theory on which the Second Circuit seemed to rely
in Freedomland.7
Such a conflict between the creation of a trust under § 7501(a)
and the involuntary assignment theory does not conclusively answer
the question of whether the Second Circuit correctly classified with-
holding taxes as second priority claims. The answer to this question
seems ultimately to depend upon the scope of the term "wages" and
the policy implications of treating withholding taxes as wages.
As to the scope of the term wages in the Bankruptcy Act,"8 the
court in Freedomland did not cite any authority for the proposition
that withholding taxes are included in wages. This is particularly
distressing in light of the most recent Supreme Court case interpret-
ing the parameters of wages, United States v. Embassy Restaurant,
Inc."9 In that case the Court held that contributions payable by the-
bankrupt employer to trustees of a union welfare fund pursuant to a
qINT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7501(a) provides that:
Whenever any person is required to collect or withhold any inter-
nal revenue tax from any other person and to pay over such tax to the
United States, the amount of the tax so collected or withheld shall be
held to be a special fund in trust for the United States. The amount
of such fund shal be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner
and subject to the same provisions and limitations (including penal-
ties) as are applicable with respect to the taxes from which such fund
arose.
"6Cf. 2 A. Scorr, TRusTS §§ 132 and 147 (3d ed. 1967).
"The court in Freedomland appeared to rely on the trust fund theory merely to
find that there was no necessity for the governments to file proof of claims under § 57
of the Bankruptcy Act and not to establish that withholding taxes should be given a
second priority. 480 F.2d at 190-91. This limited reliance appears sound and would
seem to compel a different conclusion than that reached in Connecticut Motor Lines
with regard to the filing requirement. See notes 25 and 26 supra.
'There is no definition of the term "wages" in the Bankruptcy Act.
1'359 U.S. 29 (1959).
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collective bargaining agreement were not wages within the meaning
of the Bankruptcy Act and were thus not entitled to second priority
status. The Court reasoned that "[lt is therefore evident that not
all types of obligations due employees from their employers are re-
garded by Congress as being within the concept of wages, even though
having some relation to employment." ' " The Court in Embassy
Restaurant then enumerated several factors for determining whether
a given payment by an employer is wages.
Among the factors suggested by the Court for determining the
characterization of a payment by an employer were whether the
workers had a legal interest in the fund and whether the workers
considered such payments as wages. While it is unclear whether an
employee considers withholding taxes as part of his wages, '5 1 it is clear
that the wage claimants in Freedomland had no legal interest in the
fund created by § 7501(a). They could neither exercise any control
over such withholdings52 nor could they be held liable for any funds
withheld and misappropriated by the employer. 53 Thus, it would ap-
pear that the Supreme Court's interpretation of wages in Embassy
Restaurant excludes withholding taxes from the scope of that term
as it is used in the Bankruptcy Act, and the Second Circuit commit-
ted a serious error in failing to examine the definition of wages pro-
vided by that decision.
5
1
The conclusion that withholding taxes are not part of wages is
further supported by the 1966 amendments to the Bankruptcy Act.
'"Id. at 32.
"It has been suggested that in today's market place gross wages are merely an
illusion of one's true earning power. B. BITTKER and L. STONE, FEDERAL INCOME ESTATE
AND GIFr TAXATION 14 (4th ed. 1972).
21t is true that the employee can affect the amount of taxes withheld by changing
the number of exemptions claimed. However, once the fund is collected the employee
has no rights in the fund itself. See text accompanying notes 51-53 supra.
'INT. RaV. CODE OF 1954, § 3403 provides that "[t]he employer shall be liable for
the payment of the tax required to be deducted and withheld under this chapter, and
shall not be liable to any person for the amount of any such payment."
"'There are cases holding that fringe benefits in the form of holiday or vacation
pay are within the scope of the term wages as it is used in the Bankruptcy Act. E.g.,
Sulmeyer v. Southern Cal. Pipe Trades Trust Fund, 301 F.2d 768 (9th Cir. 1962);
United States v. Munro-Van Helms Co., 243 F.2d 10 (5th Cir. 1957); California Div.
of Labor Law Enforcement v. Sampsell, 172 F.2d 400 (9th Cir. 1949). See also cases
collected at 3A COLLIER 64.202, at 2117. These cases offer little support for the
Second Circuit's conclusion that withholding taxes on pre-bankruptcy wages are them-
selves wages. In the fringe benefit cases there is a direct obligation of the employer to
the employee while in the withholding tax cases the obligation is to the Government.
See INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 3403, 7501(a). See also 3A COLLIER $ 64.202 [1], at
2117 n.1.
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The amendments limited the priority accorded to taxes in the distri-
bution of bankrupts' estates to those taxes which "became" legally
due and owing by the bankrupt and "which were not released by a
discharge in bankruptcy under § 17 of the Act. 5 5 At the same time,
§ 17a(1) was amended to conform to § 64a(4)51 by borrowing the
phrase "legally due and owing" from the latter section. The signifi-
cance of these changes to a determination of the scope of the term
wages is found in the fact that there is a provision under § 17a(1)
which specifically states that a discharge in bankruptcy shall not
release a bankrupt from any withholding taxes such as the ones in the
Freedomland case. The structuring of the amended statute is strong
evidence that Congress thought withholding taxes should be treated
independently as taxes and not as wages. This proposition is rein-
forced by the fact that § 17a(5) provides in a separate category that
certain wage claims are to be non-dischargable. Thus, if Congress
meant that withholding taxes were to be aggregated with wages, it
would seem that the legislature would refer to withholding taxes
under § 17a(5) and not under § 17a(1). In addition, if withholding
taxes are to be considered wages within the meaning of the Bank-
ruptcy Act, then Congress, by structuring § 17 as it did would be
stating redundantly that withholding taxes are nondischargable, first
under § 17a(1) as withholding taxes and secondly under § 17a(5) as
wages. It would seem that the Bankruptcy Act should be read to
avoid such repetition by treating withholding taxes as distinct and
separate from wages.5 7
The Freedomland court appeared to overlook another problem in
assigning a second priority status to withholding taxes on pre-
Act of Oct. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-496, § 3, 80 Stat. 271, amending 11 U.S.C.
§ 104a(4) (1964).
"'Act of Oct. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-496, § 3, 80 Stat. 271, amending 11 U.S.C.
§ 35 (1964). Prior to 1966, Bankruptcy Act § 17, 11 U.S.C. § 35a provided that: "[a]
discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all his provable debts whether
allowable in full or in part." Subsequent to the 1966 amendments, § 17 read in part
as follows:
(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all
of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such
as (1) are taxes which became legally due and owing ... to the United
States . . .within three years preceding bankruptcy: Provided,
however, That a discharge in bankruptcy shall not release a bankrupt
.... from any taxes . . . (e) which the bankrupt has collected or
withheld from others as required by the laws of the United States...
but has not paid over.
5'Cf. 2A J. SUTHERLAND, Statutory Construction § 46.06, at 63 (Sands 4th ed.
1973).
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bankruptcy wages. The language of § 64a(2) of the Act does not state
that wages earned by all employees within the three month statutory
period before the initiation of bankruptcy proceedings are second
priority claims. Instead, it confines priority status to wage claims due
to workmen, servants, clerks, or traveling or city salesmen." In many
instances the courts have determined that simply because a claim for
wages was made by an employee of the bankrupt in compliance with
the procedures outlined by the Act, the claim was not necessarily
entitled to second priority status.-9 Even though § 64a(2) has been
continually expanded to include other types of employees,"0 it cannot
be said that every employee's wage claim is entitled to priority. Thus,
the problem arises as to treatment of withholding taxes of employees
who earned wages prior to bankruptcy proceedings but whose claims
are not entitled to second priority status. It would appear that the
Second Circuit would not hold that such taxes are second priority
claims when the wages upon which they are based are not." If this
assumption is correct and the Second Circuit's formulation requires
different treatment of withholding taxes depending upon the priority
status of the wage claim itself, the formulation is open to additional
criticism. For example, in an estate where assets are sufficient to pay
only some priority creditors, the question of payment of the govern-
ments' claims for withholding taxes may depend entirely on the occu-
pation of the employee. In this situation, the solution of the Second
Circuit to the priority conflict has merely added more confusion and
uncertainty than existed before Freedomland.
Another shortcoming of the Second Circuit's approach is evident
when the policy of the wage priority section of the Bankruptcy Act is
considered. The reasoning behind the grant of priority to wage claims
by § 64a(2) was to protect the worker whose income was primarily
in the form of wages and whose subsistence was dependent on such
wages.6 2 Assigning a second priority status to withholding taxes would
*'Bankruptcy Act § 64a(2), 11 U.S.C. § 104a(2) (1970).
"E.g., Blessing v. Blanchard, 223 F. 35 (9th Cir. 1915) (claim of general manager
of corporation not entitled to second priority); In re Crown Point Brush Co., 200 F.
882 (N.D.N.Y. 1912) (claim of president of company not entitled to second priority).
See also cases collected at 3A COLLIER 1 64.204, at 2131.
"E.g., United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29, 35 (1959) (Black,
J., dissenting); 3A.CoLLIER T 64.201, at 2110.
11 480 F.2d at 190.
2E.g., Joint Indus. Bd. of Elec. Indus. v. United States, 391 U.S. 224 (1968);
United States v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1959); Local 140 Security
Fund v. Hack, 242 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1957); Blessing v. Blanchard, 223 F. 35 (9th Cir.
1915). See also 3A COLLIER 64.201 [3], at 2112.
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mean, however, that if the bankrupt's assets were insufficient to sat-
isfy all the claims of § 64a(2), the wage claims and the tax claims
would share pro rata in whatever payments were made. 3 Considering
the significance of withholding taxes," this would mean a smaller
share available for wage claims. 5 Such a result clearly increases the
hardship of employees who are primarily dependent on their wages
and seems contrary to the congressional policy of protecting employ-
ees.
While the priority formulations of the Third and Eighth Circuits
have several shortcomings, they do result in a determination of the
treatment to be given both withholding taxes and the related excise
taxes imposed on the employer. However, the Second Circuit's hold-
ing leaves unanswered the question of what priority, if any, should
be given to the excise taxes.6 Perhaps by expressly declining to ad-
dress the priority of the employer's taxes, the Second Circuit im-
pliedly agreed with the Third Circuit that these taxes became legally
due and owing by the bankrupt and enjoyed fourth priority.
As previously mentioned, the Second Circuit relied on § 7501(a)
13See note 14 supra.
"Treas. Reg. § 31.3402 et seq. (1971) provide tables for the determination of
amounts to be withheld by the employer, but as suggested by the courts in Fogarty
and Freedomland, the withholding taxes generally approach 25 percent of gross wages.
"An example of the diverse results of allowing withholding tax claims to share pro
rata with other second priority claims in the total funds available for wage claims, as
opposed to their treatment as fourth priority, can be illustrated as follows:
Assume there is $40,000 available for distribution after disposition of secured
creditors and payment of first priority claims, that a total of $80,000 of allowable wage
claims have been filed within the statutory period for filing claims, and that withhold-
ing taxes represent 25 percent of gross wages. If withholding tax claims are entitled to
share pro rata in the fund as second priority items $10,000 would be immediately paid
to the Government and $30,000 would be available for payment to wage claimants. If
withholding tax claims are entitled to fourth priority, however, a very different result
follows. Under INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7501(a), 25 percent of all wages "paid" would
be held in trust for the Government. The $10,000 would be held in trust for the
Government and $30,000 would be available for payment to wage claimants. However,
the $10,000 trust fund would not be payable to the Government until all second priority
claims have been paid. Thus, the $10,000 fund would still be available for payment of
second priority claims. Payment of additional wage claims, however, would again be
subject to § 7501(a) and $2,500 of the $10,000 would be held as a trust fund for the
United States. This trust fund could not be paid until after all second priority claims
had been paid. The $2,500 would then be subject to § 7501(a). The process would
continue until, in effect, the entire $40,000 was paid to the wage claimants.
"The Second Circuit based its conclusion that withholding taxes are entitled to
second priority on the proposition that the taxes were part of gross wages of the
employee. 480 F.2d at 190. It cannot, however, be said that the employer excise taxes
are part of those gross wages.
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of the Internal Revenue Code which provides for the creation of a
trust in favor of the United States whenever any person is required
to collect or withhold any internal revenue tax from any other per-
son. 7 While the court did not base its second priority holding on this
trust theory,6 8 it did maintain that the creation of a trust under
§ 7501(a) was consistent with its holding. This position was based on
an interpretation of the Supreme Court's decision in United States
v. Randall.
69
In the Randall case, the bankrupt was kept in possession of its
business by court order but was required to open three bank accounts,
one of which was for the employment taxes. After bankruptcy and
upon discovery that the bankrupt had failed to maintain the separate
tax account, the Government claimed that under § 7501(a) it was
entitled to payment of employment taxes before any other claims,
including first priority expenses of administration. The Supreme
Court rejected the Government's argument and affirmed the district"0
and circuit court's7 ' determination that the § 7501(a) trust was gov-
erned by § 64a of the Bankruptcy Act.
According to the Second Circuit in Freedomland, the rationale of
Randall was merely that of upholding the Bankruptcy Act's policy of
subordinating taxes to costs and expenses of administration. Thus,
the treatment of withholding taxes as second priority was consistent
with such policy. However, it must be pointed out that the Randall
decision represented more than the mere honoring of the policy of
subordinating taxes to costs and expenses of administration. That
policy, as the Supreme Court suggested, is related to two other con-
siderations-the overall policy of § 64a and the language of § 7501(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code.
Specifically, the Supreme Court in Randall determined that the
§ 7501(a) trust fund was subordinate to § 64a(1) of the Bankruptcy
Act. Apparently because that was the precise issue decided, the Sec-
ond Circuit in Freedomland confined the holding to a conflict be-
tween a withholding tax claim based on § 7501(a) and a claim for
"See notes 45 and 47 supra.
"It has been suggested that a trust fund theory pursuant to INT. REv. CODE OF 1954,
§ 7501(a) should in itself lead to a second priority status for the withholding taxes
under consideration. Cf. Comment, 40 N.Y.U.L. REv. 360 (1965); Comment, 63 MIcH.
L. REv. 1103 (1965); Rutgers Bankruptcy Note, supra note 28. Such a proposition,
however, ignores the language of § 7501(a). See notes 74-78 and accompanying text
infra.
p-401 U.S. 513 (1971).
7 In re Halo Metal Products, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 614 (N.D. Ill. 1968).
7'In re Halo Metal Products, Inc., 419 F.2d 1068 (7th Cir. 1969).
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first priority costs and expenses of administration. 2 Such a limita-
tion, however, ignored the Supreme Court's statement in Randall
that the entire Bankruptcy Act is an overriding statement of federal
policy on the question of priorities. 3 Contrary to the Second Circuit's
position, the holding in Randall should be interpreted to apply to all
conflicts that arise between a claim under § 7501(a) of the Internal
Revenue Code and any of the priorities of § 64a of the Bankruptcy
Act.
In addition, the Supreme Court in Randall interpreted § 7501(a)
74
to mean that the payment of the trust fund is limited by the priority
which § 64a would provide if such trust fund did not exist.7" This
made withholding taxes payable as a second priority item76 only if
they were entitled to second priority independent of any considera-
tion of the § 7501(a) trust. Similarly, as the Supreme Court pointed
out by citing In re Green77 with approval, if such taxes were entitled
to only a fourth priority independent of the trust under § 7501(a),
n480 F.2d at 190.
nWhen the Supreme Court in Randall asserted that the Bankruptcy Act repre-
sents an overriding statement of federal policy on the question of priority, it apparently
overruled several earlier cases which had held that other congressional provisions took
precedence over the general provisions of § 64 of the Act. For example, inInre Airline-
Arista Printing Corp., 156 F. Supp. 403 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), aff'd per curiam, 267 F.2d
333 (2d Cir. 1959), and in United States v. Sampsell, 193 F.2d 154 (9th Cir. 1951), the
courts determined that INT. REv. CODE OF 1939, § 3661, now § 7501(a) of the 1954
Code, took precedence over § 64. Similarly, in City of New York v. Rassner, 127 F.2d
703 (2d Cir. 1942), the court held that 28 U.S.C. § 124(a) (1940), the earlier version of
28 U.S.C. § 959 (1970), took precedence over § 64. Section 124(a) subjected a trustee,
receiver, or other similar court officer to local taxes as if the business such officer
managed were conducted by an individual or a corporation. The local statute which
precipitated the conflict with § 64a provided that a city sales tax should have status
as a trust fund, similar to the theory of § 7501(a) of the Internal Revenue Code.
7 The second sentence of the INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7501(a), provides that
"[tihe amount of such fund shall be assessed, collected, and paid in the same manner
and subject to the same provisions and limitations (including penalties) as are applica-
ble to the taxes from which such fund arose."
1401 U.S. at 517.
"It should be noted that the Second Circuit in Freedomland determined that the
withholding taxes in question were second priority items without reference to the trust
fund theory. Note 47 supra. In this respect Freedomland is in accord with the holding
of Randall.
7264 F. Supp. 849 (D. Colo. 1967). In Green the Government contended that pre-
arrangement withholding taxes which were to be paid after confirmation of the ar-
rangement proceeding, pursuant to an agreement between the Government and the
debtor, were entitled to be paid as a trust under § 7501(a) before any other claims
during the subsequent bankruptcy proceeding. The court rejected this argument and
determined that the taxes were subject to the fourth priority they would have had in
the absence of § 7501(a). Id. at 851.
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even though the trust would theoretically arise at the time of pay-
ment of second priority wage claims, the taxes would be entitled to
only a fourth priority. Thus, in Freedomland, where the holding that
taxes are essentially second priority wages seems unsound, the trust
fund theory provides no assistance. The theory cannot by itself give
a claim a higher priority than the claim would have possessed apart
from the creation of trust. Therefore, the question of what priority, if
any, is to be given to withholding and employer excise taxes 8 remains
unresolved even though there is a trust fund created by § 7501(a).
Evaluation of the several circuits' positions on the question of
what priority is to be given to withholding and excise taxes on pre-
bankruptcy wages indicates that each of the prescribed solutions has
shortcomings." Of the three formulations, the Third Circuit's holding
of fourth priority appears least objectionable since it is consistent
with the policies of the Bankruptcy Act. 0 This formulation, however,
conflicts with the plain language of the statute. In light of the rule of
construction applied to § 64a, that no priorities should be allowed
except those expressly specified,81 it appears that this position should
also be rejected and withholding taxes on pre-bankruptcy wages not
be given any priority under § 64a. This solution would not conflict
with the policy of protecting the employee in a bankruptcy proceed-
ing of his employer. The employee would not be liable for any
amounts withheld but not remitted," and also would receive payment
of his wage claim in full.8" In addition, excise taxes and withholding
taxes would be given uniform treatment. Finally, if the legislative
intent is in fact different from the literal language of § 17 and § 64a,
Congress, prodded by the Internal Revenue Service, will be more
" The trust fund created by § 7501(a) has no application to the excise taxes on
employers because these employers' taxes are not collected or withheld from another
person. See language of § 7501(a) quoted at note 45 supra.
"Bankruptcy Act § 64a(5), 11 U.S.C. § 104a(5) (1970), provides that debts to the
United States are to be entitled to fifth priority during the distribution procedure. This
section, however, excludes all taxes from its scope and would offer no solution to the
priority question of withholding or employer excise taxes.
"The Third Circuit's position is further supported by H.R. REP. No. 686, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1966). This report specified that Bankruptcy Act § 64a(4), 11
U.S.C. § 104a(4) (1970), creates a priority for taxes. There was no recognition of the
qualifying condition that the taxes must be "legally due and owing."
"Nathanson v. NLRB, 344 U.S. 25 (1952).
"I'r'. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 3403 specifies that the employer shall be liable for the
taxes withheld. Note 53 supra. Section 17a(1) (e) also provides that such withholding
taxes shall be nondischargeable. Note 56 supra.
'See text accompanyinging notes 60-62 supra.
